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STATE GOVERNMENT-THE ARKANSAS FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION AcT-HOUSTON, WE HAVE A PROBLEM: A COACH
AND A COMPTROLLER ILLUSTRATE THE REPERCUSSIONS OF
RELEASING ELECTRONIC INFORMATION THROUGH THE ARKANSAS
FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
"Justice cannot survive behind walls of silence."1 This is particu-
larly true in a democratic government, which must necessarily render
itself transparent to its citizens so that they may appropriately oversee
it to safeguard against corruption and injustice. Without this transpa-
rency, a true and free democratic state cannot exist. And this transpa-
rency cannot exist without the granting of access to the government's
activities. Otherwise, "[a] popular government without popular infor-
mation, or the means of acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a
Tragedy: or perhaps both. And a people who mean to be their own
[g]overnors must arm themselves with the power which knowledge
gives.",2 For Americans, these arms may be acquired through freedom
of information statutes.
Freedom of information statutes provide citizens of the nation
and the various states with the means to access much of their govern-
ments' records.3 Arkansas created its own version with the Arkansas
Freedom of Information Act (the FOIA) in 1967.' Since that time,
however, much has changed in the ways the government conducts its
business. Chief among these is the advent of the "electronic era, which
has given rise to a myriad of concerns over access" to governmental
records In the past year, the state of Arkansas has seen two highly
publicized scandals that arose out of this tension, as the FOIA has
been adapted and interpreted to meet these various concerns.
To understand the breadth of these issues and concerns, several
areas must be discussed. First, the FOIA itself will be examined, as its
provisions and interpretative models are explored.6 The difficulty in
1. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 349 (1966).
2. United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1976), rev'd sub nom.
Nixon v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc. 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
3. John J. Watkins & Richard J. Peltz, The Arkansas Freedom of Information
Act 1 (4th ed. 2004).
4. WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 3, at 3.
5. Richard J. Peltz, Joi L. Leonard & Amanda J. Andrews, The Arkansas Pro-
posal on Access to Court Records: Upgrading the Common Law with Electronic Free-
dom of Information Norms, 59 ARK. L. REv. 555, 557 (2006).
6. See infra Part II.A.
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analyzing electronic communications through these models will also
be explicated Next, the scandal involving former University of Ar-
kansas football coach Houston Nutt and his ordeals with the FOIA
will be examined." Lastly, the scandal spanning four court cases' re-
garding former Pulaski County Comptroller Ron Quillin will be ana-
lyzed to determine the impact of his activities on the FOIA. ° These
events uniquely display both the strengths and the weaknesses of the
FOIA, as well as show what may be seen in the future.
II. THE FOIA
"The FOIA is the people's law."" Arkansas has adopted "one of
the strongest and most comprehensive Freedom of Information Acts
in the nation," thereby ensuring that its citizens have access to infor-
mation at every level of government." This provides a necessary over-
sight by which Arkansans can monitor the actions of those within the
government." First, the actual text and traditional analyses and inter-
pretations associated with the FOIA will be discussed. 14 Next, the var-
ious issues and problems that have been caused by adapting the FOIA
to electronic communications will be detailed."
A. Provisions, Interpretation, and Analysis
As with all statutory construction, the "cardinal rule is to give full
effect to the will of the legislature.' 6 With regards to the FOIA statu-
tory scheme, that will is expressed through the FOIA's purpose:
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. See infra Part III.
9. Ark. Democrat-Gazette v. Pulaski County (Quillin I), No. CV-07-7484, 2007
WL 4739694 (Ark. Cir. Ct. June 25, 2007); Pulaski County v. Ark. Democrat-Gazette
(Quillin II), 370 Ark. 435, 260 S.W.3d 718 (2007); Ark. Democrat-Gazette v. Pulaski
County (Quillin III), No. CV-07-7484, 2007 WL 4739693 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Aug. 2, 2007);
Pulaski County v. Ark. Democrat-Gazette (Quillin IV), 371 Ark. 217, 264 S.W.3d 465
(2007).
10. See infra Part IV.
11. Arkansas Attorney General's Office, ARKANSAS FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
HANDBOOK 2 (12th ed. Jan. 2006).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See infra Part II.A.
15. See infra Part II.B.
16. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2004-348 (2004).
[Vol. 31
2008] ARKANSAS FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 161
It is vital in a democratic society that public business be performed
in an open and public manner so that the electors shall be advised
of the performance of public officials and of the decisions that are
reached in public activity and in making public policy. Toward this
end, [the FOIA] is adopted, making it possible for them, or their
representatives to learn and to report fully the activities of their of-
ficials.
17
This laudable purpose is effectuated through key provisions in the
FOIA which grant Arkansas citizens considerable access to the state
government, through its records18 and meetings." The government's
records are presumed to be public and open to the state's citizens if
they are "maintained in public offices or by public employees within
the scope of their employment."20 This presumption is rebuttable, the
burden of which must be carried by the agency resisting disclosure.21
The FOIA also ensures that its purpose may not be thwarted by
prohibiting the transfer, withdrawal, or destruction of documents in an
attempt to prevent their release to the public.' It further guarantees
that Arkansans will have some degree of oversight of their govern-
ment by requiring that governmental meetings be held in public and
that notice of the meetings be given to anyone who requests it. 
3
Numerous legal entities provide binding and persuasive authority
as to how the FOIA should be interpreted so that its purpose may be
realized. Of course, the various judicial courts of the state interpret
the statute as any case before them may require. Yet several FOIA
issues have yet to be addressed by these courts, leaving a vacuum
where guidance is still necessary. 24 In these instances, the Arkansas
Attorney General often provides instruction. While Arkansas judicial
opinions are typically lockstep with the Arkansas Attorney General's
17. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-102 (LEXIS Repl. 2002).
18. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(a) (LEXIS Supp. 2007).
19. Id. § 25-19-106. While the provisions related to meetings are undoubtedly
important when understanding the FOIA, they are beyond the scope of this Comment
as they do not relate to the factual circumstances discussed in Parts III and IV infra.
20. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-103.
21. Gannett River States Publ'g Co. v. Ark. Indus. Dev. Comm'n,, 303 Ark. 684,
690, 799 S.W.2d 543, 547 (1990).
22. WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 3, at 20-22.
23. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-106. While this ensures oversight, it does not pro-
vide for participation; whether a citizen has a right to be heard at public meetings is
beyond the FOIA's ambit. WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 3, at 26. Also, some admin-
istrative agencies are governed by specifically-tailored statutes which exempt them
from this openness requirement. WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 3, at 26.
24. WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 3, at 28.
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interpretations of the FOIA, the latter "are not binding and lack the
legal force of appellate court decisions." Nonetheless, the Arkansas
Attorney General's reading of the statute can be highly persuasive,
particularly when a court is resolving a previously unlitigated aspect of
the FOIA.26
Professors John J. Watkins and Richard J. Peltz have authored a
treatise (the "Treatise") on the FOIA that has been highly influential
upon both the judiciary and the Arkansas Attorney General's Office
for decades. Several of their legal proposals have been adopted by the
courts, and the Treatise is frequently cited as persuasive authority on
the subject. This extensive and exhaustive treatise is in its fourth edi-
tion and is a key asset in understanding the FOIA.
Governmental entities generally adhere to certain guidelines
when interpreting the FOIA provisions. Because of the broad purpose
behind the FOIA that was geared towards an open government, it
should "be liberally interpreted to the end that its praiseworthy pur-
poses may be achieved. 27 Thus, any exceptions to the FOIA's purview
are necessarily interpreted narrowly.2 Courts may deviate somewhat
from these general interpretative schemes, however, where common
sense dictates an alternative result.29 Nevertheless, such interpreta-
tions will still be consistent with the overall purpose behind FOIA. °
Irrelevant to such an analysis, however, is the purpose for which
an individual seeks access to a governmental record." "This is because
all FOIA requestors have an equal, and equally qualified, right to in-
formation. 3 2 As such, Arkansas law recognizes the norms of requester
neutrality and motive immaterially in its analyses and acknowledges
that a requestor's personal information is immaterial.33
With these general interpretive guidelines in mind, it is necessary
to examine whatever the particular circumstances at hand may be.
First, it must be determined whether an entity that has been requested
25. WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 3, at 28.
26. E.g. City of Fayetteville v. Edmark, 304 Ark. 179, 185, 801 S.W.2d 275, 278
(1990).
27. Laman v. McCord, 245 Ark. 401, 404-05, 432 S.W.2d 753, 755 (1968).
28. Id. at 406, 432 S.W.2d at 756.
29. Sebastian County Chapter of American Red Cross v. Weatherford, 311 Ark.
656, 658-59, 846 S.W.2d 641, 643 (1993).
30. WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 3, at 11.
31. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2004-258 (2004).
32. Id.
33. Peltz, Leonard & Andrews, supra note 5, at 706. See also Ark. Op. Att'y Gen.
No. 2007-215 (stating that "the FOIA does not afford access to public records by vir-
tue of one's position or status.")
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to comply with a provision of the FOIA is in fact subject to the act.'
Next, if that entity is indeed within its ambit, the custodian of records
must determine whether the requested records are subject to release."
Lastly, if the FOIA does require that the records be released to the
public, the custodian of records must determine whether any legal
limitations apply which prevent the records from being released under
some other form of law. 6 If a custodian is still unclear as to whether to
comply with the FOIA, he may consult the Attorney General's office
for assistance.37
1. Entities Who Must Comply with FOIA Requests
Initially, an agency must determine whether it is within the pur-
view of the FOIA." In a very broad sense, "[t]he FOIA applies to all
governmental entities."39 It enumerates several applicable governmen-
tal entities and also contains a catchall provision that extends its appli-
cability to any governmental entity that receives or spends public
funds."° Consequently, even the legislative, executive, and judicial
branches of the government are subject to the FOIA.4'
Further, this public funding provision has been extended so that
certain private entities have been found to be subject to the FOIA.42
With that said, determining whether a private entity must comply with
a FOIA request has proven much more complicated in comparison to
public entities. Essentially, the FOIA extends to publicly funded pri-
vate organizations that share a "symbiotic relationship" with the gov-
ernment.43 The statute states that "private organizations.., supported
wholly or in part by public funds or expending public funds" must
comply with its provisions." Still, various judicial interpretations of the
FOIA have expanded the requirement into a three-part test, which
34. See infra Part II.A.1.
35. See infra Part II.A.2.
36. See infra Part II.A.3.
37. See infra Part II.A.4.
38. WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 3, at 30.
39. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 96-013 (1996).
40. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-103(5) (LEXIS Supp. 2007); see also WATKINS &
PELTZ, supra note 3, at 30.
41. WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 3 at 33, 35. Administrative agencies with quasi-
judicial functions are also within FOIA's ambit. WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 3, at
45.
42. WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 3, at 30.
43. WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 3, at 51.
44. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-103(4); see also WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 3 at
47-8.
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was first delineated by Professors Watkins and Peltz: "the FOIA ap-
plies only to private organizations that (1) receive public funds, 5 (2)
engage in activities that are of public concern, and (3) carry on work
that is intertwined with that of government bodies."' Various courts
have justified this extension to private parties because of the addition-
al guarantee that the government will be open and public, and should
not escape oversight when it "seeks to conduct its affairs through pri-
vate entities. 47 Otherwise, the government could easily circumvent
the FOIA by enlisting private entities to perform its obligations in
secret, though those entities would essentially be the government it-
self.
48
2. Records Subject to Release Under FOIA
Once it has been established that an entity, whether public or pri-
vate, is subject to the FOIA, a citizen may request access to certain
records held by that entity. First and foremost, the FOIA is concerned
with granting access to records and not necessarily to information. 9
Initially, the FOIA establishes a presumption that a record is open to
public access if it is "maintained in public offices or by public em-
ployees within the scope of their employment. '"o The government can
rebut the presumption only by demonstrating that the record does not
indicate either performance or lack of performance of official func-
tions.51
Such public records include:
"writings, recorded sounds, films, tapes, electronic or computer-
based information, or data compilations in any medium, required
by law to be kept or otherwise kept, and which constitute a record
45. "Public funds means moneys belonging to government, or any department of
it, in the hands of a public official." Sebastian County Chapter of American Red Cross,
311 Ark. at 659, 846 S.W.2d at 643.
46. WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 3, at 50. It is unclear how much interrelated-
ness between the private and public entities is necessary for the former to become
subject to FOIA. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 92-205 (1992). It is clear, however, that it is
subject to FOIA when it "receives public funds for the general support of activities
that are closely aligned with those of government." WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 3,
at 52.
47. WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 3, at 51.
48. Id.
49. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2005-100 (2005).
50. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2005-139 (2005).
51. Id.
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of the performance or lack of performance of official functions.
,52
The FOIA will grant access to such records that have been origi-
nated within the agency itself or received from third parties. 3 These
records are presumed to be open to the public so long as they are
made or received in relation to the agency's duties.' This can be prob-
lematic in certain instances, however, because "the personal activities
of a public official or employee [may be] inextricably linked to his or
her governmental role."55
3. FOIA Limitations
If an entity is within the FOIA's ambit and the requested records
are likewise subject to release under the act, a records custodian must
then determine whether the requested information is excepted from
release because of some exemption or limitation on release that is ex-
ternal to the FOIA. The limitations may arise from statutory exemp-
tions within the act,56 constitutional limitations,57 or limitations arising
under federal law.58
a. Statutory exemption
The FOIA statutorily exempts certain public records that would
otherwise be accessible to Arkansans." As these exemptions are man-
datory, a custodian may not release affected records, even in the in-
terest of furthering the overall purpose of the FOIA.6° Many of these
exemptions recognize the privacy interests that are attendant to each
record. For example, records containing information relating to state
income taxes, medical records, the identities of certain undercover law
enforcement officials, and the home addresses of private citizens are
exempt from disclosure.6' Additionally, many exemptions from other
statutes are incorporated by reference, such as grand jury minutes,
52. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-103(5)(A) (LEXIS Supp. 2007).
53. Bryant v. Mars, 309 Ark. 480, 485, 830 S.W.2d 869, 872 (1992).
54. WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 3, at 91.
55. WATKINS & PELTZ,supra note 3, at 93.
56. See infra Part A.3.a.
57. See infra Part A.3.b.
58. See infra Part A.3.c.
59. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105 (LEXIS Supp. 2007).
60. See id. § 25-19-105(b).
61. Id. § 25-19-105.
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unpublished working materials of members of the executive and judi-
cial branches, and military discharge records.62 Lastly, in recognition of
its impact on public contracts, the FOIA also exempts commercial
records that "would give advantage to competitors or bidders."63
Furthermore, even if a record does contain exempt information in
addition to public information, a redacted version of the record that
deletes exempted information may be released.6'
b. Constitutional limitations
The Arkansas Constitution provides numerous safeguards to pro-
tect the privacy rights of individuals.6 This constitutional right against
the otherwise lawful intrusion of the government can supersede the
dictates of the FOIA to protect individual privacy. 66 However, this
right does not encompass every scrap of information that an individual
would prefer to keep out of the public domain; rather, the requested
record should be released "unless it can be factually established that
[to do so] would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of... per-
sonal privacy."6 This right to privacy, as endowed by the Arkansas
Constitution, applies to information that "(1) an individual wants to
and has kept confidential; (2) can be kept confidential but for the chal-
lenged governmental action in disclosing information; and (3) would
be harmful or embarrassing to a reasonable person if disclosed." 68 Fur-
ther, a series of factual inquiries must be conducted: initially, the cus-
todian of the records must examine, on the basis of the facts before
him, whether the information is protected; if he so determines, he
must weigh the public's legitimate interest in disclosure against the
protectable interest. 69 Naturally, the party protesting the disclosure
will have the burden of demonstrating that the privacy interest is
guarded by the Constitution.7' This analysis aids courts in protecting
Arkansans from "clearly unwarranted invasion[s] of personal privacy"
that are likewise prohibited under the FOIA.71
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. § 25-19-105(f)(2).
65. Alexander Justiss, Note, Is the Arkansas Supreme Court Abandoning Judicial
Federalism?, 30 U. ARK. LrrrLE ROCK L. REV. 105,138 (2007).
66. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2004-178 (2004).
67. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2005-131 (2005).
68. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2004-178 (2004).
69. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2006-158 (2006).
70. Id.
71. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2004-012 (2004).
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There is no definitive rule for determining whether an invasion of
privacy is warranted. Whether disclosure must be made depends upon
the nature of the requested record and its relationship to the purpose
of the FOIA, which is to ensure an open government. It is the burden
of the party protesting disclosure to establish that his privacy interest
outweighs the public's.73 As to the privacy interest that weighs in the
balance, there is only a "substantial privacy interest in records reveal-
ing the intimate details of a person's life, including any information
that might subject the person to embarrassment, harassment, disgrace,
or loss of employment or friends. 74 Further, there is a presumption
that the individual's privacy interest is somewhat substantial where
there is little public interest to begin with.75
As to whether the public has a compelling public interest in the
information's release is factually dependent.76 For example, the bu-
reaucratic rank of the employee in the government is relevant.' Addi-
tionally, employee activities that undermine the public's trust in the
government or compromises the safety of the public are compelling
public interests.78 Also, Arkansas courts have noted that additional
weight should be given to the public's interest where there are allega-
tions of sexual misconduct on the part of the employee.79 Lastly, even
if records do contain information that is protected by the constitution,
such information may be redacted from the record so that only consti-
tutionally disclosable information is released."0
72. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2004-258 (2004).
73. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2004-012 (2004) (quoting Stilley v. McBride, 332
Ark. 306, 312-13,965 S.W.2d 125,127-28 (1998)).
74. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2006-225 (2006); see also Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No.
2004-167 (2004). For example, the Attorney General has noted that "if the content of
a particular resignation letter is personal in nature, conveying personal and intimate
details of the employee's life, it is exempt from disclosure" because it does not "impli-
cate the privacy concerns reflected in [the FOIA]." Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2006-216
(2006).
75. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2004-012 (2004).
76. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2004-058 (2004).
77. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2004-178 (2004).
78. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2005-175 (2005).
79. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2004-012 (2004) (noting that "[a]llegations of sexual
harassment by a highly placed official are of paramount public concern and outweigh
an official's privacy interest in keeping such information out of the public eye" and
that "the public does have a compelling interest in the release of job performance
records relating to sexual misconduct"); Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2005-236 (2005)
(stating that "information relating to sexual misconduct in connection with public
employment gives rise to a compelling public interest.")
80. See Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2005-004 (2005).
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c. Federal law
Federal law exists which may supersede the FOIA and prohibit
disclosure of certain information. For example, a public educational
institution may lose its federal funding for complying with a FOIA
request if it violates the Federal Educational Rights and Privacy Act
of 1974 (FERPA).8 FERPA prohibits disclosure of certain educa-
tional records, particularly if it contains personally identifiable infor-
mation.8 Additionally, the Federal Freedom of Information Act may
prohibit an otherwise permissible release for certain records that are
transmitted between state and federal agencies.83
4. Assistance from the Arkansas Attorney General's Office
Public officials are permitted to consult with the Arkansas Attor-
ney General's Office when they remain unclear as to whether FOIA
compliance is necessary.' In certain circumstances, it may be highly
advisable for such officials to request and rely upon such opinions be-
cause of the likelihood that they will be not be held liable for criminal
or civil actions relating to the FOIA response taken.85 Further, private
citizens may seek assistance for issues pertaining to personnel and job
evaluation records.8
B. The Issues that Arise with Electronic Communication under
FOIA
Unfortunately, the FOIA was created for a time still governed by
tangible communication when the common law was still wary of elec-
tronic media,87 long before electronic communication would dominate
the way people interact with one another.' At least part of this tension
stemmed from determining whether the manner in which a record is
stored may qualitatively alter it, regardless of whether the content
81. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2004-018 (2004).
82. Id. FERPA defines "education records" as "records, files, documents and
other materials which... contain information directly related to a student." 20 U.S.C.
1232(g)(a)(4)(A) (2006).
83. WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 3 at 14.
84. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-16-706 (LEXIS Repl. 2002).
85. See WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 3, at 28.
86. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-105(c)(3)(B) (LEXIS Supp. 2007).
87. Peltz, Leonard & Andrews, supra note 5, at 724.
88. See Brian G. Brooks, Adventures in Cyber-Space: Computer Technology and
the Arkansas Freedom of Information Act, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 417
(1995).
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contained therein has actually changed.89 This has created considera-
ble confusion as the FOIA has been interpreted to resolve modem
problems, causing courts to "look at the present through a rear-view
mirror. ' 9° The General Assembly first addressed this problem when it
amended the FOIA in 2001 to reflect the impact of new and evolving
communicative technologies.9 The amendments conformed the FOIA
to address a new age in which the government and its affiliates relied
heavily upon electronic communication in the "creation, use, and sto-
rage of public records."9 To illustrate the various issues that have ari-
sen during this electronic age, the manner in which access to electronic
information may be granted will first be discussed.9 Next, the particu-
lar privacy concerns that have become heightened through the release
of electronic information will be detailed.94
1. Access to Electronic Communications through FOIA
The FOIA explicitly states that electronic communications are
within its purview." This eradicates any lingering doubt, if there was
any, that the FOIA applies to records that only exist as electronic da-
ta.96 If the data is duplicable, the FOIA further permits Arkansans to
copy these records in any readily available medium.9 Indeed, the
FOIA implicitly encourages the custodian of such records to "compile,
tailor, or summarize requested electronic data in an electronic for-
mat."98 It should be noted, however, that the FOIA does not place an
affirmative duty on the State or its employees to maintain electronic
copies of all of its records."
89. E.g. Peltz, Leonard & Andrews, supra note 5, at 721-22.
90. MARSHALL MCLUHAN & QUENTIN FIORE, THE MEDIUM IS THE MESSAGE 75
(1967).
91. Peltz, Leonard & Andrews, supra note 5, at 611. The impetus for this amend-
ing came primarily from recommendations of the Arkansas Electronic Records Study
Commission. Id.
92. ANNAMARY DOUGHERTY, JEFF HARPER, TERRY D. JONES, DREW
MASHBURN, AND N.M. NORTON, WHAT You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT PUBLIC
RECORDS AND MEETINGS IN ARKANSAS 133 (2006).
93. See infra Part II.B.1.
94. See infra Part II.B.2.
95. DOUGHERTY ET AL.,supra note 92, at 137.
96. See WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 3, at 422.
97. See id. at 423.
98. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2004-023 (2004).
99. See WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 3, at 425.
UALR LAW REVIEW
Emails pose especially difficult questions with regards to the re-
lease of records through the FOIA due to their ephemeral nature.' °°
The Arkansas Attorney General's Office has nevertheless provided
some guidance on the issue. For example, several opinions stated that
a series of electronic communications may constitute a "meeting" to
which the public must have access. The possibility that a series of
emails may constitute a meeting occurs along a spectrum that his high-
ly fact dependent."' On one end of the spectrum, emails generally do
not constitute a meeting for purposes of FOIA.' 2 This is primarily due
to the similarity between electronic communication and traditional
tangible communication. 3 But many Attorney General opinions have
cautioned that, at the other end of the spectrum, a series of interre-
lated email exchanges can constitute a meeting.' ° For example, such
electronic communication may constitute a meeting where a series of
emails concerning a single topic between a group of people suggests
that the essential deliberations of a meeting are taking place."1 , Unfor-
tunately, the plasticity of this spectrum does not offer much comfort to
an agency that is confronted with circumstances or facts that fall in the
middle of this spectrum."° Nevertheless, various judicial and Attorney
General opinions indicate certain factors will tend to demonstrate
whether a series of electronic communications do constitute a meet-
ing: where there are signs that public discussion is intentionally being
avoided;' whether actions that were taken after the communications
have been sent would normally be precipitated by a meeting;'0 8 wheth-
er the public was privy to any of the deliberations that gave rise to the
e-mails, or the e-mails themselves;"° and whether the e-mails consti-
tute something more than simply traditional communication or the
passive receipt of electronic communications."' If such communica-
tions do constitute a meeting, the proper public official is required to
100. See WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 3, at 433. This is particularly true because
such records are routinely deleted by employees. See id. at 432.
101. See Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2005-166 (2005).
102. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2005-166 (2005).
103. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2005-166 (2005).
104. See e.g., Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2001-305 (2001).
105. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2005-166 (2005).
106. Id. This ambiguity is likely to persist until the Arkansas Supreme Court has
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"provide the requisite public notice and some means for the public to
monitor the discussion. 11
There is no question, however, that emails are subject to disclo-
sure as records under the FOIA. 2 As with any tangible record that a
citizen desires to access, whether a specific e-mail will be subject to
disclosure will "depend upon the content of the document and wheth-
er it reflects the performance or lack of performance of official func-
tions that are or should be carried out by a public official or em-
ployee. 113 As such, the fact that the recipient of an email is a public
employee does not in of itself subject it to the risk of disclosure."'
2. Privacy Concerns
The established boundaries of an employee's constitutional right
to privacy become much more complicated when dealing with their
electronic communiques outside those traditional bounds."5 This prob-
lem is particularly compounded because employee's typically have an
expectation of privacy when communicating through e-mail."6 This
expectation arises because the private and public lives of government
employees converge in their various electronic communications, much
as with private employees. 7 Initially, the FOIA appears to resolve any
privacy issue in this regard because public records are limited to
"records of performance or lack of performance of official functions,"
which may prevent the disclosure of personal communications.' As
Professors Watkins and Peltz note, however, "[a]n argument can be
made that if an employee is using state computer resources for per-
sonal correspondence, that use reflects the 'lack of performance of
official functions,' either because state computing resources are being
misappropriated or because the employee is handling personal matters
while on the state clock."' 9 While these experts conclude that such an
argument is tenuous at best, its soundness will be examined at length
in Part IV."O A similarly murky issue arises when a governmental em-
111. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2005-166 (2005).
112. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2001-305.
113. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2007-290 (2007).
114. Id.
115. Indeed, others have argued that the right is "on thin constitutional grounds to
begin with" and is not absolute. Peltz, Leonard & Andrews, supra note 5, at 711.
116. See WATKINS & PELTZ,supra note 3, at 436.
117. See WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 3, at 436-37.
118. See WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 3, at 437.
119. See WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 3, at 438.
120. See infra Part IV.
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ployee conducts public business through his personal computer or e-
mail-as the content of a record determines whether it is subject to
release under FOIA; such communications are at risk because the
form of communication itself is irrelevant.'
It should not be implied, however, that all electronic information
is immediately encompassed by the FOIA the moment a public em-
ployee comes into contact with it. Rather, an employee's privacy in-
terest still prevails in numerous aspects. For example, public em-
ployees' personal email addresses are not subject to release under the
FOIA because there is little or no public interest in such information
that could override the employees' interest.' Conversely, there is no
"privacy interest in work email addresses [that] is substantial enough
to override the public's interest" because they do not reflect any inti-
mate details of the employee's life.'" These issues and potential prob-
lems were fully realized in a series of scandals that demonstrated the
many strengths and weaknesses of the FOIA.
III. THE STRENGTH OF THE FOIA: THE HOUSTON NuTr SCANDAL
Razorback sports are an obsession for many Arkansans. 4 It is the
closest thing to a professional sports franchise in the state, and many
citizens are proud alums of the University of Arkansas."z Perhaps that
is why so many in the state responded so harshly when some strange
and scandalous rumors slowly disseminated from Old Main. In a very
narrow sense, the scandal is about former University of Arkansas
football Coach Houston Nutt, the public's perception of his profes-
sional ability (or lack thereof) and his relationship with the fans, com-
petitor universities, and a woman to whom he was not married.2 6 In a
much broader context, however, the story is more about Arkansas
citizens "using all of the tools at their disposal to demand accountabili-
121. See WATKINS & PELTz,supra note 3, at 439.
122. Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2006-165 (2006).
123. Id. See also Ark. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2004-225 (2004) (stating that "it is diffi-
cult to conceive of any privacy interest that public employees could assert in their
work e-mail addresses.")
124. George Waldon, A Banner Year for UA Athletic Upheaval, ARK. BUSINESS,
Dec. 24, 2007.
125. See id. The author is among them.
126. Tony Barnhart, Fit to be Hogtied, ATLANTA JOURNAL AND CONSTITUTION,
May 31, 2007. "And if you don't know about all of this by now, you've been living
either in a cave or in France." Jan Cottingham, Who's Zoomin' Who, ARK. BUSINESS,
May 21, 2007.
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ty from public officials,""i for which the FOIA was more than ade-
quate.
A. The Emails
On December 7, 2006, Teresa Prewett exercised what may be
kindly referred to as poor judgment and sent an email to then-
Arkansas Quarterback Mitch Mustain to express her views about his
athletic ability and behavior off of the field."" As a booster and close
friend of the Nutt family, Prewett felt compelled to convey her dissa-
tisfaction with Mustain, as well as her desire that he quit the team.129
The email was largely incited by a book that had recently been pub-
lished about Mustain in which he allegedly made disparaging com-
ments towards Nutt.13' This e-mail was rife with invective and personal
insults against the eighteen year-old freshman."' Given the somewhat
tense relationship between Mustain and Nutt, some theorized that the
coach encouraged or at least condoned the e-mail.
Indeed, given prior related incidents, it would seem disingenuous
for Nutt to suggest that he had no knowledge whatsoever of Prewett's
hostility towards Mustain and his immediate family. In May 2006, a
127. Barnhart, supra note 126.
128. Cottingham, supra note 126. Prewett sent a copy of this email to both Coach
Nutt's wife, Diana, as well as his brother, Danny Nutt, who was the running backs
coach for the Razorbacks. Id.; see also Mark Minton, Truth-Seeking or Fan Interfe-
rence? A New Breed of Razorback Fan has Gone From Mere Spectator to Actively
Investigating Coaches, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, April 17, 2007. Mustain was the
USA TODAY's National High School Offensive Player of the Year. Kelly Whiteside,
At Arkansas, Turmoil Becomes Norm-Athletics Endures Six-Month Saga, USA
TODAY, May 29, 2007.
129. Cottingham, supra note 126. This e-mail was sent one day after a similar one
had been sent to sports editorialist Wally Hall, which had condemned his coverage of
Razorback football. Id.
130. Whiteside, supra note 128.
131. Whiteside, supra note 128. An excerpt from the e-mail:
Competition scares the shit out of you, doesn't it little boy? Please trans-
fer. All you've been since you walked onto campus is a cancer... Why is
it that you came to Arkansas again? Was it so your mommie could be
close by to change your diaper, or was it because you thought having [Of-
fensive Coordinator Gus Malzahn] on the sideline would make playing the
SEC easier?
Whiteside, supra note 128.
132. Mark Minton, McAfee Describes 'Scolding' by Nutts, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE, May 17, 2007. Byron Freeland, Coach Nutt's attorney, friend, and Sunday
School teacher, would later call this theory "full of crap." Id.; Jim Harris, Citizen
Journalist Covers Football Beat, ARK. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2007.
UALR LAW REVIEW
similarly-derogatory e-mail was sent from Nutt's personal email ac-
count to Prewett's roommate, Sherri Darby.'33 The e-mail described an
incident in which Mustain's mother, Beck Campbell, had been severe-
ly battered and was written in a gloating and mocking tone."' The e-
mail concluded with the author expressing a desire to have assisted
with the assault."" The authorship of this e-mail remains in question
because of the absence of any formal investigation into the physical
computers owned by the Nutts and Darby.'36 Indeed, Darby even
gloated that no one could prove one way or another who had actually
sent the e-mail "[u]nless the police [came] into our house and [Hou-
ston's brother, Danny Nutt's] house and [took] the computers."'37
On January 5 of the following year, Campbell took action in the
interest of Mustain's well-being and forwarded Prewett's e-mail to the
University of Arkansas Chancellor John White.'38 White immediately
promised decisive action and directed Razorbacks Athletic Director
Frank Broyles to look into the incident.'39 Interestingly, White also
directed Nutt to assist with the investigation, despite his known asso-
ciation and familiarity with Prewett, because Nutt denied having any
prior knowledge of the email."4 Shortly thereafter, Prewett wrote an
133. Mike Masterson, Questions Remain, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, Nov. 13,
2007. Coach Nutt has denied sending the e-mail, "which leaves dangling the question
of who did." Id. While Coach Nutt has denied responsibility for authoring the e-mail,
he has admitted that it was also sent to an e-mail address used by his wife, Diana.
Michelle Bradford, Filing Says UA Investigation Mishandled; Attorney Wants Suit
Upheld, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETtE, May 30,2007.
134. Masterson, supra note 133.
135. Masterson, supra note 133. An excerpt from the email:
Did you know she [Mustain's mother] once lived in Fayetteville? You
probably already know that she has rental property and that's how she
makes her living. Anyway, some renters beat the shit out of her several
years back so she moved to Springdale and claims she HATES Fayetteville
because of that. Of course the renters went to jail, but I wish I were one of
them, do you blame them?
Masterson, supra note 133.
136. Michelle Bradford, Attorney: Cover-up Evidence in Email-Harassing Mes-
sages to UA Athlete at Root, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETE, Aug. 9,2007.
137. Id. This activity has not gone unnoticed. Attorney Eddie Christian, Jr. has
alleged in a related lawsuit that this e-mail "points to a cover-up by key witnesses in
the case stemming from an e-mail sent in December to Mitch Mustain." Id.
138. Marty Cook, Documents Reveal Little About Email, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE, Nov. 7, 2007.
139. Id.
140. See Id.; see also Chris Givens, Mustain Asks UA for Detail-E-Mail Investiga-
tion at Center of Request, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, Oct. 25, 2007.
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apology letter expressing regret for the e-mail.' White also charged
Nutt with reprimanding Prewett over the incident-Nutt responded
with relatively minor sanctions. 142 Satisfied with the matter, White con-
tacted Campbell to officially condemn the e-mail and to assure her
that Nutt had taken appropriate action.43
Campbell, however, was far from satisfied.' She again contacted
White to demand that the university conduct a full investigation into
the incident' 5 In the midst of this turmoil and scandal, several con-
cerned outsiders began to use everything at their disposal to uncover
the truth. Foremost amongst this arsenal was the FOIA.
B. The FOIA Requests
The first, and expected, FOIA requests related to this matter
came through Mustain's attorney, Tim Hutchinson.' 46 Presumably,
these requests were simply to garner more information into the inci-
dents directly affecting the freshman's scholastic and athletic activi-
ties. 147 The next, and unforeseen, FOIA requests came from Thomas
McAfee, "a fresh-faced, clean-cut 28-year-old" who would likely con-
sider himself among the "obsessed" Razorback fans. 4 ' McAfee wrote
a simple, yet broad, FOIA request to the university for copies of all
communications between Nutt, his brother, and Prewett over several
months preceding the publicized e-mail to Mustain. 149 Among the
communications that were subject to release under FOIA were Nutt's
telephone records from University of Arkansas cell phones. " Rather
than filtering through Nutt's doubtlessly immense records for those
specifically requested, the university simply sent all of them to McA-
141. Cook, supra note 138.
142. Cook, supra note 138. These sanctions included a letter of reprimand, as well
as being barred from the sidelines during football games. Cook, supra note 138; Ron
Higgins, Hogs Coach Standing Strong-Nutt Determined to Weather Recent Strife,
MEMPHIS COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Apr. 27,2007.
143. Givens, supra note 140.
144. E.g. Bradford, supra note 133.
145. Bradford, supra note 133.
146. Wally Hall, UA Doing Nothing to Delete Emailgate Debate, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETrE, Nov. 8,2007. Tim Hutchinson is a member of the Williams and Hutchinson
law firm. Givens, supra note 140.
147. E.g. Givens, supra note 140.
148. Cottingham, supra note 126.
149. Minton, supra note 128. McAfee expressly stated that "[t]his correspondence
between the Nutts and Prewett would include emails, letters, records of phone calls,
text messages, and what dates they were made." Minton, supra note 128.
150. Harris, supra note 132.
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fee."' In retrospect, this time-saving decision proved to have grave
consequences for Nutt and his family.'52
Almost immediately, McAfee noticed a phone number amongst
the records that Nutt frequently contacted.' Eventually, the number
was revealed to belong to Donna Bragg, a news reporter from Fort
Smith. Nutt had exchanged more than 1,000 calls or text messages
with Bragg in just a two month period."5 While the frequency of the
communications seemed curious, the contents of the messages them-
selves remain a mystery'56 as Nutt claimed the messages could no long-
er be retrieved. Nutt, however, claimed that the frequent communica-
tions were devoted to a non-profit organization with which the two
were involved, and that Bragg was merely a friend. "7 Intrigued by the
wealth of information he had acquired through FOIA, McAfee began
to distribute these records amongst his friends, and a forty-eight page
"mystery report" surfaced shortly thereafter.'"
C. The Mystery Report
The mystery report compiled information from the requested
records, as well as media reports of the ongoing debacle. 9 It culled
the various records and organized them into three principle areas: the
communications between Nutt and Prewett; the voluminous ex-
changes between Nutt and Bragg; and certain isolated phone calls that
Nutt made to athletic officials at two separate universities, each of
which had recently opened up coaching positions.' The mystery re-
port quickly disseminated on message boards for sports discussion on
the internet, and McAfee emailed his own findings to White, the Uni-
151. Amy Upshaw, Nutt, Fan Square off Over Texts, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE,
May 4, 2007. In all, the information totaled over 500 pages of phone records. Cotting-
ham, supra note 126.
152. Upshaw, supra note 151.
153. See Harris, supra note 132.
154. See Higgins, supra note 142.
155. Harris, supra note 132. One of these text messages was sent twenty-seven
minutes before the kickoff of the Capitol One Bowl on January 1. Id. While the exact
language of the message remains undisclosed, Bragg claims to have told Nutt to
"[wiatch our warriors play with all their heart and spirit and win." Minton, supra note
128. The Razorbacks lost 17-14 to Wisconsin. Harris, supra note 132.
156. Harris, supra note 132.
157. Id.
158. Cottingham, supra note 126. McAfee denies creating the report and has de-
clined to name who its author or authors may be. Cottingham, supra note 126.
159. Minton, supra note 128.
160. Minton, supra note 128.
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versity of Arkansas Trustees, and the University of Arkansas System
President B. Alan Sugg. 16' Almost immediately, Nutt retained Byron
Freeland as counsel to allege that McAfee had defamed the coach and
illegally interfered with his contract with the university and demanded
a meeting with the enthusiastic fan to discuss what had happened.,62
McAfee then readied himself for an emotional showdown with the
coach. 63
On May 3, the two, along with Houston's wife, Diana, gathered
for a terse and brief meeting.' 6' Each had made several demands of
the other, though neither conceded: McAfee wanted Nutt to produce
a transcript of his text messages with Bragg or to provide access to the
memory chip in his phone; Nutt demanded to know if someone had
urged McAfee to pursue the matter and specifically whether McAfee
had had any discussions with Mustain 6 1 While Nutt was willing to let
McAfee physically inspect the phone within the meeting, he would not
surrender its internal memory card that contained the phone's stored
information; McAfee denied having had any external influences, from
Mustain or otherwise.' 66 The meeting thus ended at a stalemate, with
Diana accusing McAfee of trying to humiliate her family.
67
D. Impact of the FOIA Requests
On April 24, attorney John A. Terry filed a public exaction suit
against the university and its officials, charging that tax dollars had
been "wasted, misused, misapplied and wrongfully or illegally spent"
because of the way the email investigation had been handled.' 6 Terry
161. Harris, supra note 132.
162. Upshaw, supra note 151. Freeland himself seemed perplexed by the scandal,
noting that "[t]his is not life or death. It's football." George Waldon, A Banner Year
for UA Athletic Upheaval, ARK. BUSINESS, Dec. 24, 2007.
163. Minton, supra note 132. McAfee retained Nate Coulter of Little Rock. Harris,
supra note 132.
164. See Upshaw, supra note 151. While Coulter tactfully described the meeting as
"candid," he dryly noted that McAfee did not ask for Nutt's autograph. Id.
165. Minton. supra note 132.
166. Id. The SIM card was particularly desirable because Nutt claimed that he did
not have access to the messages and his phone company was unable to provide them;
yet a computer forensics expert may have been able to retrieve messages that had
been deleted. See Editorial, Nutt Defends Text Message Mania with Female Anchor,
CAPITAL TIMES, Apr. 18, 2007. One such expert, Christopher Taylor, noted that it was
"definitely possible." Minton, supra note 132.
167. Minton, supra note 132.
168. E.g. Bradford, supra note 133; Associated Press, Hogs Try to Quash Fan's
Plan, MEMPHIS COMMERCIAL APPEAL, May 6, 2007. Essentially, the suit alleged that
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filed subpoenas to acquire physical access to the cell phones and hard
drives which had already yielded much information through standard
FOIA requests."'
In response to the ongoing scandal, mounting lawsuits, and unre-
solved issues that had been exacerbated by Nutt's unwillingness to
cooperate, Razorback fans revolted. They flew banners over football
games that mocked the coach, much to the cheers of the fans below.'
Nutt, however, proclaimed that he was not giving any serious thought
to resigning.71 Nutt complained about the public's access to his
records, deriding the entire process as "ridiculous."'' Nutt also be-
came antagonistic with media outlets that frequently questioned him
about the possibility of resigning, and he even became so emboldened
as to confidently point out that his coaching contract did not end until
2012.' But the damage had been done: Nutt resigned on November
26 after ten seasons with the Razorbacks, and only a matter of months
since the FOIA requests had begun to pour in.174 He blamed his depar-
ture on family concerns and disloyal fans, and accepted a coaching
position at the University of Mississippi the very next day.17 Nutt's
long and prestigious career had ended abruptly and sourly, giving that
much more credence to the power behind the FOIA, as well as ample
reason to examine its lasting effects from this scandal.
"White failed to do his job." Id. For that reason, Terry included an additional barb by
seeking to enjoin Sugg from paying White his salary. Whiteside, supra note 128.
169. Associated Press, supra note 168. Unfortunately for those seeking further
clarification of the issues, the case was quickly dismissed on procedural grounds. Noah
Trister, Ex-Player E-mail Suit Dismissed, TULSA WORLD, June 5, 2007.
170. Tom Murphy, Messages Not Flying with Hogs, ARK. DEMOCRATE-GAZETTE,
Oc. 26, 2007.
171. Bill Haisten, Turmoil Persists for Nutt: The Arkansas Coach Says He Won't
Resign, Despite Criticism from Some Razorback Fans, TULSA WORLD, May 20, 2007.
172. Editorial, The Problem with Houston-The Law Applies to Sports - and
Coaches, Too, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Oct. 21, 2007. Nutt also complained that
"[t]his [was] all just so crazy and stupid. That's what makes [me] mad. At the end of
the day, what have [they] done? Nothing, except try to tear you down." Haisten, su-
pra note 171.
173. The Problem with Houston, supra note 172.
174. See Chris Bahn, What Dreams May Come: After 10 Years, Nutt Takes Finan-
cial Settlement to New Job in Mississippi, ARK. BUSINESS, Dec. 3, 2007.
175. Id. Nutt's contract payout from the University of Arkansas amounted to $3.2
million. Seth Blomely, Nutt's Payout Said to Contain No Public Cash, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Nov. 30, 2007.
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E. The Strength of the FOIA
If nothing else, this debacle illustrates the powerful effects that
can result through the use of the FOIA. But it has also been instruc-
tive in other ways. Many have found much encouragement in the saga,
as they believed that the state's citizens properly exercised their rights
through the FOIA to uncover the truth behind their government's
activities. " ' Further, the episode served as an interesting educational
tool for both the parties involved and the public at large, who were
largely uninformed about the mechanics and even the existence of the
FOIA.'
This lesson did not come without a price, however. McAfee and
his family received death threats in response to his utilization of his
rights as an Arkansas citizen.178 Mustain and other gifted players from
the Razorback football team transferred to other schools, after having
played only one season with the team. 7' And University officials of-
fered resoundingly negative responses to the entire ordeal. Without
mincing words, White stated that he was "embarrassed for our
state."'' Broyles went so far as to allege that many fans had engaged
in "evil, sinful, un-Christianlike things."'' Nutt, who resigned in the
face of the mounting scandal without any unequivocal evidence that
he had acted improperly," strongly resented Arkansas fans use of the
FOIA, calling it "overboard,"' 83 "crazy, and stupid."' '8
In fact, several comments from the university's officials have indi-
cated that they are now more concerned with dodging the FOIA than
with rectifying the incidences that led to this scandal. For example,
176. Meredith Oakley, Grabbing at a Few Facts Doesn't Constitute Truth, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Apr. 18, 2007. Many believed that the state's media was par-
tially to blame, which was viewed as too timid in pursuing the story. Id.
177. Cottingham, supra note 126. Originally, MacAfee had been unaware that an
"average citizen" could utilize the FOIA. Cottingham, supra note 126.
178. Cottingham, supra note 126.
179. Higgins, supra note 142.
180. Wally Hall, E-Mail Investigation Botched from the Start, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE, June 3, 2007. White has since hired an additional staff attorney because of
the invigorated FOIA requests that began to flood the University. Whiteside, supra
note 128.
181. Higgins, supra note 142.
182. Editorial, Nutt Defends Text Message Mania with Female Anchor, CAPITAL
TIMES, Apr. 18, 2007. In response, Nutt said that any who "suggest[ed] he had an
improper relationship with a woman were spreading 'unfounded gossip' that had hurt
his wife." Id.
183. Whiteside, supra note 128.
184. Haisten, supra note 171.
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Nutt stated that the biggest lesson he learned was that he should not
have used a cell phone purchased by tax dollars." Further, White
claimed that he would put "nothing in writing" nor use his university-
issued cellphone when conducting a search for a new athletics direc-
tor."8 Others have simply noted that the lesson these officials will take
away is to avoid University phones and avoid FOIA requests'
It is interesting to note the role of the Razorback Foundation may
play in this scenario if some officials attempt to dodge the FOIA. The
Razorback Foundation is a private organization that raises money for
the University, and exclusively acquires and sells tickets to all of the
university's athletic activities." It essentially operates, however, under
the influence of the university.'89 In the aftermath of the scandal, a
rumor began to circulate that many of the university's records had
been reallocated to the Razorback Foundation to remove them from
the reach of the FOIA.190
But university officials would be foolish to attempt such a ma-
neuver: under these or similar circumstances, the Razorback Founda-
tion would unequivocally be subject to the FOIA under these circums-
tances. The FOIA expressly anticipates such a situation, and it guaran-
tees that a governmental agency may not thwart its purpose by trans-
ferring its records outside of the agency in order to prevent its release
to the public. Unfortunately, this hypothetical is not bound within the
imaginary. As will be seen, the various governmental bodies of Arkan-
sas have been all too willing to circumvent to the FOIA and prevent
Arkansans from realizing a truly transparent government.
IV. THE WEAKNESS OF THE FOIA: THE RON QUILLIN SCANDAL
In January of 2007, a reporter for the Arkansas Democrat-
Gazette presciently wondered whether "there [was] something We the
People of Pulaski County [were not] being told about our county gov-
ernment?"' 91 Within months, that question was answered in a resound-
ing affirmative, as a story involving corruption, embezzlement, and sex
185. Haisten, supra note 171.
186. Whiteside, supra note 128.
187. Cf. Whiteside, supra note 128.
188. http://www.razorbackfoundation.net/foundation.htm
189. Essentially, "the [Razorback Floundation's role is to support whatever the
[university] wants to do." Blomely, supra note 175.
190. Harris, supra note 132. University officials have denied this rumor. Harris,
supra note 132.
191. Editorial, Who Was Really Responsible?, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Jan. 14,
2007.
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began to unfold. Yet a much graver problem surfaced when the story
was almost hidden from the public due to the government's interfe-
rence with Arkansans' right to oversee their government's activities.
After an array of FOIA requests was issued, two appeals were made
to the Arkansas Supreme Court, and countless dollars in litigation
costs were expended, the truth had been uncovered. The truth behind
former Pulaski County Comptroller Ron Quillin, who betrayed the
trust of his family, friends, co-workers, and the taxpayers to pursue an
adulterous affair that cost the county tens of thousands of dollars.' 9,
But perhaps the greatest damage was done to the FOIA, which the
Arkansas Supreme Court sharply limited as it unsuccessfully tried to
determine how electronic communications should be analyzed
through the FOIA.
A. The Affair
Quillin began his duties as acting comptroller in August 2000.193
Despite misgivings about his qualifications,1" he was entrusted with
administering Pulaski County's $60 million dollar budget after earning
the trust of his superiors through his thirteen years of service with the
county government."9 To assist with managing the finances of the
county, Quillin engaged the services of Government e-Management
Solutions (GEMS).19 He proceeded to orchestrate a contract on be-
half of Pulaski County with GEMS worth over one million dollars. '1 It
was through this contractual relationship that Quillin would begin one
of a more personal nature, with GEMS Director of Client Services
Cheryl Zeier.' 8
192. Amy Upshaw & C.S. Murphy, The Unraveling of High Regard-Quillin's
History Overlooked, Foreshadowed His Behavior, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Oct.
14, 2007.
193. Stacy Hudson, 2007 Leftover Funds has County Breathing Easier, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, Feb. 15, 2008.
194. At least one person opined that Quillin "didn't know what he was doing." Id.
Regardless of his level of competence, Quillin had a varied criminal history: he once
battered his wife (with whom he had entered into a bigamous marriage), he was con-
victed of drunken driving, and portentously, had committed forgery by illegally writ-
ing checks from his family's bank account. Upshaw & Murphy, supra note 192.
195. Upshaw & Murphy, supra note 192.
196. Upshaw & Murphy, supra note 192.
197. Amy Upshaw, E-Mails Show Try to Bypass Rules, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE, Oct. 14, 2007. It does not appear that the formation of this contract was
made through Quillin's improper influence, despite its eventual outcome. Id.
198. Upshaw & Murphy, supra note 192.
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The two initially constrained their relationship to work purpos-
es,'" but it was not long before each expressed a desire to pair business
with pleasure.2" Zeier eventually made a business trip to Little Rock
to see Quillin, and an affair quickly commenced. °" But Quillin did not
have the financial resources to support both himself and his new long
distance affair,'2 so, he began to steal.0 3
First, Quillin siphoned funds from a county bank account for
which he was serving as an officer.2' Next, Quillin scheduled out-of-
town conferences to meet up with Zeier, all on the county's tab.2 It
was also during this time that he used a "county cell phone to text sex-
ually graphic conversations, which he later forwarded to his govern-
ment email account." 20 The two frequently discussed-while on the
taxpayer's dime-in graphic detail the sexual acts in which they
wanted to participate. 2' The messages also contained numerous pho-
tographs of women's clothing and jewelry that Quillin offered to buy
Zeier, even though it would "drastically diminish the sugar daddy re-
serve."
208
199. Upshaw & Murphy, supra note 192.
200. Upshaw & Murphy, supra note 192.
201. Upshaw & Murphy, supra note 192. The two met, along with coworkers, at a
local bar in Little Rock, Arkansas. Upshaw & Murphy, supra note 192. It was at this
early stage that one of Quillin's associates already noticed that there was an inappro-
priate relationship between the two, when she "felt Zeier's legs moving up until her
feet landed in Quillin's lap under the table." Upshaw & Murphy, supra note 192.
202. Upshaw & Murphy, supra note 192.
203. Upshaw & Murphy, supra note 192.
204. Upshaw & Murphy, supra note 192.
205. Kristin Netterstrom & Amy Upshaw, Quillin E-Mails Released, Show Steamy
Affair-Messages Reveal Pair Making Plans to Meet, Trading Photos, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Oct. 9, 2007. Quillin and Zeier met on one such trip in Reno,
Nevada. Upshaw & Murphy, supra note 192. This vacation, arranged at the county's
expense, succeeded in wooing Zeier, who later recalled "enjoy[ing] reliving those
memories and making more new ones." Upshaw & Murphy, supra note 192. Quillin
even slimmed down enough to lose his "double chin." Upshaw & Murphy, supra note
192.
206. Netterstrom & Upshaw, supra note 205. They even petnamed one another:
Quillin became "Bubbu," and Zeier became "Baby Sweetie Darlin Gorgeous." Mere-
dith Oakley, E-Mails are Public's Business, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Aug. 5,2007.
207. Upshaw & Murphy, supra note 192. For example: "I just can't get enough of
making love to you and feeling your sensual body against mine!" and "the sex with
you is always mind blowing," (Kristin Netterstrom & Van Jensen, Account Left Open
Pointed to Quillin-Colleague Noticed 'Unfamiliar Activity', ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE, June 17, 2007); and "I want to make love to you!" (Netterstrom & Upshaw,
supra note 205.)
208. Netterstrom & Upshaw, supra note 205.
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Unfortunately, the affair blinded Quillin to the impending finan-
cial crisis that faced the Pulaski County "sugar daddy reserve."2'9 Quil-
lin's revenue projections for Pulaksi County were inexcusably incor-
rect, and the county entered into dire financial straits.2° This time
would come to be known as "the crisis. 21' But Quillin's dismal per-
formance with the government was clearly not enough to hinder him,
as he shortly became the chief financial officer of Medicaid at the De-
partment of Health and Human Services.212
Quillin would not have long to enjoy his new position, however.
Immediately upon his departure as comptroller, his former coworkers
began discovering irregularities in various county checking accounts. 3
The county began to investigate Quillin's past activities, and it quickly
became obvious that he had stolen taxpayers' money.1 The office
contacted the prosecuting attorney's office to apprise them of the em-
bezzlement, and a warrant was quickly issued.215 On June 4, 2007, Quil-
lin was arrested without incident. 6 He was formally charged with sev-
eral felonies relating to his embezzlement of over $42,000.00 in county
funds, as well as the misdemeanor offense of abuse of office.217 While
this scandal ended with Quillin entering a guilty plea in exchange for a
twenty-year prison sentence and court-ordered restitution,"' his stea-
my messages had caused a new scandal to boil.
209. Upshaw & Murphy, supra note 192.
210. Upshaw & Murphy, supra note 192.
211. Upshaw & Murphy, supra note 192.
212. Upshaw & Murphy, supra note 192.
213. John Lynch & Kristin Netterstrom, Charges Link Quillin Affair, County
Funds-Ex-Comptroller Used the Cash to Buy Lover Gifts, Jegley Says, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, Aug. 30, 2007.
214. Upshaw & Murphy, supra note 192.
215. Upshaw & Murphy, supra note 192.
216. Upshaw & Murphy, supra note 192. Though without incident, the arrest was
certainly tense: Quillin was "bobbing his head in resignation," and the arresting depu-
ties stated they "were about to totally obliterate his entire world" and feared that
Quillin was a danger to himself. Upshaw & Murphy, supra note 192.
217. Kristin Netterstrom, Justices Asked to Unseal Files in Quillin Case-Make
Appeal Briefs Available, Newspaper's Attorney Urges, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE,
Aug. 31, 2007.
218. John Lynch, Quillin Admits Stealing $42,954-Ex-Official Gets 20-Year Term,
ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Sep. 29, 2007. Quillin and his wife sold their home in
attempts to repay the county. Id.
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B. The FOIA Requests
In an effort to determine the impetus behind Quillin's embezzle-
ment, the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette, which publishes the state's
most widely circulated newspaper, issued a broad FOIA request to the
county for any messages exchanged between the former comptroller
and all GEMS personnel."' While the county acquiesced in releasing a
portion of the messages, some 660 others were withheld because they
were deemed to be "personal., 220 County Judge Buddy Villines
claimed that "county employees have a right to privacy and that the
messages had nothing to do with county business." 22' In the interest of
uncovering the truth and providing the information to the public, the
newspaper brought suit against Pulaski County to compel the gov-
ernment to comply with FOIA 2
C. Quillin I
The matter was brought before Circuit Judge Mary McGowan. 3
Judge McGowan made several findings of fact and law regarding the
matter, and she placed particular focus on the emails within the con-
text of the business and personal relationship between Quillin and
Zeier 4 Initially, Judge McGowan noted that while Zeier may have
had a protectable privacy interest in another context, "any such hope
or expectation was lost when the [e-mails] were exchanged on [Quil-
lin's] government email account.2  Judge McGowan then noted the
219. Meredith Oakley, Faith in Court Remains Shaken, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE, Oct. 7, 2007. The county was able to restore the messages despite his at-
tempts to delete all of them upon his departure. Lynch & Netterstrom, supra note 213.
As a matter of internal policy, the county makes backups of the messages of all de-
partment heads in the event that their successors will need the information. Kristin
Netterstrom, Quillin's Emails Ordered Released-Two of 600-Plus Deemed Too Racy,
ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, Aug. 3,2007.
220. Oakley, supra note 219.
221. Lynch & Netterstrom, supra note 213. As a reporter with the Arkansas Dem-
ocrat-Gazette stated, the county might as well have claimed that the emails were
"none of the public's business." Meredith Oakley, 'Personal' Doesn't Mean 'Private',
ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETrE, June 17, 2007.
222. See Oakley, supra note 219.
223. Kristin Netterstrom, Quillin's E-Mails Deemed 'Public'-Exchanges Linked
to Job, Judge Says, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, June 20,2007.
224. Ark. Democrat-Gazette v. Pulaski County, No CV-07-7484, 2007 WL
4739694, at *3 (Ark. Cir. Ct. June 25, 2007).
225. Id. Further, any privacy interest would have greatly outweighed the public's
right to access the records, as their interests were "paramount" in this case. Id.
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presumption that the e-mails were public records because they were
maintained in a public office by a public employee within the scope of
governmental employment.26 Furthermore, the county failed to rebut
this presumption because the records were not proffered to the court.
Without being able to examine the e-mails themselves, Judge McGo-
wan next declared that the taxpayers had a right to know whether
Quillin's adulterous affair had impaired his duties as an officer for the
government. 27 She justified this decision by noting that it was "imposs-
ible" to separate the personal emails from the business emails because
both were so intertwined with one another, particularly because of the
possibility that "[t]he personal relationship may have influenced [Quil-
lin] in expenditures of funds of Pulaski County. ', 2' Therefore, Judge
McGowan ruled that emails exchanged between Quillin and Zeier
were public records because the county could not prove otherwise.229
Judge McGowan ordered the release of the emails, with the exception
of certain messages containing sexually graphic photos.23° Pulaski
County immediately appealled to the Supreme Court of Arkansas.3
D. Quillin H
On appeal, the Arkansas Supreme Court stated that the primary
contested issue was whether the e-mails were public records under the
FOIA 2 The court noted that it generally construes the FOIA broadly
to provide greater public access to governmental records, but that this
general proposition must be constrained by a "common sense ap-
proach." 23 The court, in relying upon reasoning offered in the Trea-
tise, determined that the FOIA should only apply to "those records
made or received 'in connection with' or 'relating to' the agency's du-
ties." In the context of personal emails sent and received through go-
vernmental accounts, the court further took notice of Professors
Watkins's and Peltz's suggestion that the "to", "from," and "subject"
fields of the messages can be examined to determine whether the
226. Id. at *4.
227. Id.
228. Id. at *3.
229. Editorial, Let the Public In-Our Secretive Bureaucrats, ARK. DEMOCRAT-
GAZETTE, Oct. 13, 2007.
230. Id.
231. Oakley, supra note 219.
232. Pulaski County v. Ark. Democrat-Gazette (Quillin II), 370 Ark. 435, 438, 260
S.W.3d 718, 720 (2007).
233. Id. at 440, 260 S.W.3d at 721.
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records constitute a lack of performance that would subject the
records to release.'
The court then looked to other jurisdictions' handling of similar
matters for guidance. 5 The court noted that other state supreme
courts have utilized "a content-driven analysis in determining whether
a document is a public record" because mere possession of a docu-
ment by an agency should not in of itself be determinative of its status
as a public record. 6 Pulaski County argued in favor of such an analy-
sis, and it reasoned that it could not be properly conducted without an
in-camera review by a trial court3' Lastly, the court also noted that
this approach had been approved by Professors Watkins and Peltz in
the Treatise."
The court agreed and held that an in camera review was neces-
sary. 239 The court stated that the status of the e-mails as a public record
could only be determined by examining their content rather than the
context in which they were sent. Essentially, the electronic communi-
cations would only be declared public records if they had a "substan-
tial nexus" with the employee's governmental responsibilities.21 As
such, the court opined that such a factual review of the content of the
e-mails was necessary to determine whether there was an appropriate
nexus between the personal and business relationship between Quillin
and Zeier to necessitate their release through the FOIA.2 1 With that
determination, the divided court ordered the trial judge to review all
660 messages that the county had withheld to determine which were
public records and should therefore be released.2 2 Villines claimed
this ruling as a victory, claiming that his goal had always been "a re-
view by an independent party." '243
The dissenting justices heavily criticized the majority's reliance on
secondary authority in rendering its decision.2' These justices stated
234. Id.
235. Id. at 441, 260 S.W.3d at 722.
236. Id. at 441-43, 260 S.W.3d at 722-23.
237. Id. at 443-44, 260 S.W.3d at 723-24.
238. Quillin H, 370 Ark. 435,444, 260 S.W.3d 718, 724 (2007).
239. Id. at 446,260 S.W.3d at 725.
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Oakley, supra note 219.
243. Kristin Netterstrom, Justices Partition Quillin's E-Mails-Review by Judge to
Pick Public Ones, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETFE, July 21, 2007. It is interesting to note
that the county never sought review of the matter by the Arkansas Attorney Gener-
al's Office, the independent party that typically reviews such matters.
244. See Quillin H, 370 Ark. 435,450 & n.1, 260 S.W.3d 718, 728 & n.1 (2007).
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that the extra-jurisdictional cases relied upon by the majority were
based upon interpretations of "public records" that greatly vary from
the FOIA, making reliance upon them inappropriate. 2" Furthermore,
the dissenting justices claimed that the FOIA and the case law pertain-
ing to its analysis is "so clear, so positive, that there is hardly any need
for interpretation."2 ' As such, they stated that the FOIA's express
statement that records held by public employees are presumed to be
accessible by the public, and that Pulaski County made no attempt
whatsoever to rebut that presumption.247 Because of the failure to do
so, the dissenting justices argued that "remanding the matter for an in
camera examination was unwarranted and a complete waste of
time."24'8
E. Quillin III
To complete the task set by the Arkansas Supreme Court, Judge
McGowan combed through printouts of all of the emails from Quil-
lin's county computer.2 49 Judge McGowan stated that the e-mails evi-
denced a highly enmeshed business and sexual relationship between
Quillin and Zeier.25° This level of intertwining made it "impossible to
discern which emails or parts of emails were strictly personal or busi-
ness because they were often mixed together. ' 'nI Judge McGowan
then cited several emails to support this claim, all of which "indi-
cate[d] that Quillin favor[ed Zeier] regarding business besides plea-
sure." 2 There were also several suspect emails indicating that Quillin
245. Id. at 447, 450,260 S.W.3d at 726, 728 (Imber, J., dissenting).
246. Id. 448, 260 S.W.3d at 727 (quoting City of Fayetteville v. Edmark, 304 Ark.
179, 185, 801 S.W.2d 275, 278 (1990)) (Glaze, J., dissenting).
247. Id. at 448-49, 260 S.W.3d at 727-28 (Glaze, J. dissenting).
248. Id. at 449,260 S.W.3d at 728 (Glaze, J. dissenting).
249. Netterstrom, supra note 219. Judge McGowan acerbically noted that it would
have been interesting for her to rule that the emails were personal, because many had
already been divulged to the Arkansas Democrat-Gazette. Kristin Netterstrom, Will
Be Tough to Decide What's Public, Judge Says of 600 E-Mails-Ex-Comptroller's
Records Under Examination, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, July 25, 2007.
250. Quillin III, No. CV 07-7484, 2007 WL 4739693, at 3 (Ark. Cir. Ct. Aug. 2, 2007).
251. Kristin Netterstrom, Quillin's E-Mails Public Records, Justices Declare-
County's Second Appeal Fails, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Oct. 5, 2007. Judge
McGowan nevertheless found some e-mails more easier to discern than others:
Zeier:"I'm purring as I write type."
Quillin: "Oooh baby! You know what ur purring makes me do and what I think
about. Hard firm tongue pressed against u, just waiting for ur body to shutter [sic]!"
Oakley, supra note 206.
252. Quillin III, 2007 WL 4739693, at 5. For example, Quillin wrote the following
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had purchased jewelry for Zeier, which may or may not have been
purchased with public funds. 3 Further, "the overwhelming majority of
the emails were written during business hours on business days." '
Judge McGowan therefore concluded that these emails were a record
of Quillin's performance or lack of performance and should be made
available to the public. She excluded without explanation, however,
certain emails containing sexually graphic photos of Quillin and Zei-
255er.
Villines's ultimate goal of attaining independent review was ap-
parently not achieved by this in camera review that had been con-
ducted by an impartial party: he directed the county to immediately
appeal the decision and to request a stay on the ordered release until
the Arkansas Supreme Court could hear the matter again. 6
F. Quillin IV
1. Majority Opinion
The majority opinion, authored by Justice Gunter, agreed with
Judge McGowan that Zeier had waived her privacy interests, and af-
firmed the circuit court's order to release the records.257 The court first
dealt with Zeier's privacy arguments.2 8 She argued that her reputation
would have been irreparably damaged if the e-mails had been released
because of their personal content, which in and of itself would consti-
exchanges to Zeier:
"I have one staff person who stated last week that GEMS doesn't even
understand their own systems and that has created problems for us in the
past. I don't believe that anymore than I believe I'm the sexiest man in
America. LOL.'; "You do an outstanding job for [GEMS] and if I had 6 of
you I would have a fantastic department here but no one can compare with
you! I am thankful that I have you in other ways and that ultimately is
more important that having 6 of you working for me. I want you to always
know that I love you. I care about you. I support you and will always be
here for encouragement or as a getaway to all that's going on. Just like
you have constantly been for me."
Id. at 5-6.
253. Id. at 11.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 12.; Netterstrom, supra note 250.
256. Netterstrom, supra note 219. Villines now stated that he did not want to vi-
olate any governmental employees' right to privacy and that the government did not
have "a clear definition of what a public record is." Netterstrom, supra note 219.
257. Pulaski County v. Ark. Democrat-Gazette (Quillin IV), 371 Ark. 217, 219,264 S.W.3d
465,466 (2007).
258. Id. at 219-20, 264 S.W.3d at 467.
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tute an unconstitutional invasion of privacy." The court quickly dis-
missed this claim, stating that Zeier was aware of the risk that the e-
mails could become public, and she willfully disregarded that risk.6°
Zeier continued to transmit and receive sexual messages to and from
Quillin on private business and county email accounts and thus for-
sook any expectation of privacy she might have otherwise claimed.261
Indeed, Zeier was patently aware of the risk associated with sending
such communications to Quillin's government account because she
playfully admonished him for sending sexually explicit material
through work e-mail.62
Next, the court addressed Pulaski County's argument that the
Quillin H mandate-to examine the content and not the context of the
e-mails-had been violated by Judge McGowan in Quillin 111.263 The
majority disagreed, noting that Judge McGowan had apparently "re-
viewed each e-mail for content as instructed."2 ' Furthermore, the
county's argument to the contrary was baseless because there was
nothing in the record to indicate that Judge McGowan had not fol-
lowed the court's prior mandate.6 " Thus, nearly four months after the
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette initially filed its FOIA request with the
county, 66 the court dismissed the county's contentions that the e-mails
had been improperly reviewed at the circuit court level.267 The court
took great care to caution that the mere presence of an e-mail on a
county computer did not automatically render it a public record and
that the context of the e-mail still governed its status. 6
2. The Dissenting Opinion
The dissenting justices, however, were far from finished with the
matter. Several justices issued vociferous opinions to discuss their fru-
stration and disagreement with the court's general handling of the
matter since its inception.
259. Id.
260. Id. at 221,264 S.W.3d at 468.
261. Id. Zeier promptly hung up on a reporter who asked for her comment on the
judge's ruling. Netterstrom, supra note 250.




266. Netterstrom, supra note 250.
267. Quillin IV, 371 Ark. At 221-22,264 S.W.3d at 468.
268. Netterstrom, supra note 250.
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Justice Danielson wrote a dissenting opinion to present his posi-
tion that the Supreme Court had completely disregarded the will of
the people, as espoused by the General Assembly.269 Justice Danielson
stated that the legislature explicitly mandated that an e-mail is pre-
sumed to be a "public record if it does not constitute a record of an
employee's performance or lack of performance of official functions.' °
As Pulaski County did not rebut that presumption, the matter should
never have been remanded to the circuit court for further review."'
Justice Danielson also offered what he believed to have been a
proper analysis of the issue at hand.' While he would have reached a
substantively similar result as Judge McGowan at the circuit level,
Justice Danielson stated that the consideration of whether the e-mails
were private or sexually graphic was completely inappropriate.2 Jus-
tice Danielson opined that because the statutory language of FOIA
does not account for such considerations, they should be abandoned
before conducting a FOIA analysis.274 Rather, "the sole consideration
is whether the record itself constitutes a record of the performance or
lack of performance of a public official., 275 For these reasons, Justice
Danielson would have ordered the release of all of the e-mails under
FOIA, including the sexually graphic messages.2 6
Justice Glaze also "took issue with the manner in which Justices
Jim Hannah, Jim Gunter, Donald Corbin, and Robert Brown handled
the case" when it had come before the court three months prior.277 Jus-
269. Quillin TV, 371 Ark. at 222, 264 S.W.3d at 469 (Danielson, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part).
270. Id. at 223, 264 S.W.3d at 469 (Danielson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part). Justice Danielson did caution that he was "in no way stating that every email
sent from or delivered to a government computer or government email account con-
stitutes a public record under the FOIA.... [Rather], those decisions must be made on
a case by case basis." Id. at 224, 264 S.W.3d at 470 (Danielson, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
271. Id. at 223, 264 S.W.3d at 469 (Danielson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part).
272. Id. at 224-25, 264 S.W.3d at 470 (Danielson, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part).
273. Id. at 225, 264 S.W.3d at 471 (Danielson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part) (noting that whether such emails are sexually graphic "is of absolutely no mo-
ment as such designations are simply irrelevant in the context of a FOIA case").
274. Id. (Danielson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating that "[a]ny
other consideration is erroneous").
275. Quillin IV, 371 Ark. 217, 225, 264 S.W.3d 465, 471 (2007) (Danielson, J., con-
curring in part, dissenting in part).
276. Id. at 225-26 & n.7,264 S.W.3d at 471 & n.7 (Danielson, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
277. Oakley, supra note 219.
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tice Glaze emphasized that the FOIA is designed for expeditious ac-
tion, whether through release of records or a prompt explanation of
why they are exempt. 8 Instead, Justice Glaze felt that "Pulaski Coun-
ty ha[d] done nothing but delay access to the records, contrary to the
intent of the [FOIA]. 279 Justice Glaze also accused the majority of
assisting the county in this endeavor by trying to "place a square peg
in a round hole." Thus, the majority's remand and accommodation
of the county's delaying tactics was wholly inconsistent with the pur-
pose of the FOIA.7'
G. The Weakness of the FOIA
The greatest weakness in the FOIA comes from without: the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court. Inexplicably, the majority court justices in
Quillin II misinterpreted the FOIA's plain and express language, the-
reby weakening one of the citizens' strongest statutes. But their moti-
vations, much as their deliberations, are black boxes to the outside
world. Whatever their underlying justifications, "Pulaski County
Judge Buddy Villines and . . . four accommodating state Supreme
Court justices ... ignored decades of case law and the plain language of
the [FOIA]." m Foremost, the majority unnecessarily fretted over the
sexual nature of many of the e-mails. Such consideration was wholly
irrelevant. A public employee cannot remove governmental records
from the FOIA's ambit because of the foolish decision to include por-
nography therein. Rather, as pointedly noted by Justice Danielson,
"the sole consideration in determining whether the record is a public
record and one subject to disclosure is whether the record itself consti-
tutes a record of the performance or lack of performance of a public
official."' As such, the Quillin IV majority did not wholly rectify its
earlier error, as even these sexually explicit e-mails should have been
released. These records, just as much as those that the majority or-
dered to be released, indicated Quillin's lack of performance of his
official duties. Undoubtedly, the private lives of certain individuals in
this case, already given great exposure, would have come under even
278. Quillin IV, 371 Ark. at 227, 264 S.W.3d at 472 (Glaze, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
279. Id. (Glaze, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
280. Id. at 228,264 S.W.3d at 472 (Glaze, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
281. Id. at 228,264 S.W.3d at 473 (Glaze, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
282. Oakley, supra note 206.
283. Quillin IV, 371 Ark. at 225, 264 S.W.3d at 471 (Danielson, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) (emphasis in original).
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greater embarrassing scrutiny had these additional e-mails been re-
leased. But that is the consequence for conducting such personal and
intimate matters on government funded equipment while ostensibly
on the taxpayers' payroll. 4 To do otherwise grossly distorts the spirit
of the FOIA, which was designed to promote a transparent govern-
ment, and not to protect its inefficient employees by concealing evi-
dence of their incompetence.
The Quillin II majority's decision presents other concerns as well.
The Quilin II dissenting justices offered several criticisms for the ma-
jority's reliance upon secondary and persuasive authority in making its
holding. The dissenting justices rightfully stated that the majority un-
necessarily relied upon other states' freedom of information laws
when interpreting Arkansas's distinct statute. Other jurisdictions can
provide excellent examples of alternative treatments of interpretative
matters where there is no guidance on that point within the state.'
That, however, was not so in these circumstances at all: the Arkansas
FOIA is "one of the strongest [freedom of information] laws in the
nation... and to resort to other jurisdictions for interpretations wea-
kens it to its core."' The FOIA was also unambiguous on the matter,
making it wholly unnecessary to look beyond Arkansas's borders to
resolve this issue. The dissenting justices, however, misplace their ve-
hemence in criticizing the majority's examination of the Treatise.
While it is by no means binding authority, the text has been used nu-
merous times by both the Arkansas Supreme Court and the Arkansas
Attorney General's Office for decades in resolving FOIA issues. To
silently and suddenly ignore the text in this case would prove perplex-
ing and would raise serious questions as to the justices' examination of
the matter at hand.
284. This sentiment was echoed by Katherine Shurlds, a media law instructor at
the University of Arkansas, who stated that
Even though there isn't a county policy on e-mail usage, government em-
ployees shouldn't have an expectation of privacy ... The taxpayers have
the right to know what you're doing with their money, and if their money
is being used to pay for your cell phone, your computer, then I don't know
why that isn't a public record.
Netterstrom & Upshaw, supra note 205.
285. For example, the Arkansas Supreme Court wisely examined other jurisdic-
tions treatments when deciding to break with federal precedent in its treatment of the
constitutional right to privacy and intimate association, for which there was a dearth
of interpretative Arkansas case law. See generally Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 80
S.W.3d 332 (2002).
286. Netterstrom & Lynch, supra note 242.
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While the Treatise was rightfully consulted in Quillin H as an ex-
cellent resource, the majority nonetheless unwisely applied some of its
suggestions to these circumstances. Unlike the vast majority of their
work and the court's prior adoptions, the suggestions taken in this case
do not bode well for the FOIA. First, the suggestion to simply ex-
amine the subject headings of the e-mails is insufficient. As Quillin
demonstrated, this can be too easily flouted in a series of e-mails with
the subject line "Job Security!", Quillin and Zeier carried on the fol-
lowing communication:
Zeier: ". . . I wanted to say [I love you]."
Quillin: "What did you want to say? That you love me, miss me,
can't live without me, want to make love to me? God I hope it's all
that and more because I know that's how I feel." 87
Clearly, access to a record should not depend on the label placed upon
it, particularly when the maker of the record may desire to conceal the
contents within.
But the faultiest suggestion offered in the Treatise that was
adopted by the Quilin H majority regards the new in camera review,
which Professors Watkins and Peltz only casually comment "would
require bringing suit." Few taxpayers-for whom the FOIA was de-
signed-have the resources necessary to pursue such an avenue of
recourse to the Supreme Court (and back, in this instance) if the gov-
ernment refuses to rebut the presumption that is mandated by the
FOIA. More importantly, Arkansans should not have to bear this fi-
nancial hardship: the burden is upon the government to demonstrate
why any presumptively open records should not be released, and it
subverts the FOIA to require persistent record-seekers to shoulder
the economic burden of litigating its cause. In these circumstances, the
Arkansas Democrat-Gazette shouldered that economic burden. 9 But
certainly the average citizen, for whom the FOIA was designed, can-
not rightfully be expected to have the same level of resources as the
most powerful media outlet in the state.29" Furthermore, the General
287. Netterstrom, supra note 219.
288. WATKINS & PELTZ, supra note 3, at 438.
289. Netterstrom, supra note 250. The newspaper was reportedly "proud" to do so.
Id.
290. Indeed, few "taxpayers [would] have enough money to afford the legal costs
attendant to making them do so in case after case ad infinitum." Meredith Oakley,
Limiting Public's Right to Know Won't Be Forgotten, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE,
July 25, 2007.
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Assembly apparently did not intend that the citizens be required to do
so, having made no mention whatsoever of this process or its require-
ment within the FOIA.
The only outcome from these errors that will quarantine the ef-
fects of the Arkansas Supreme Court's mistake will be if they limit the
application of the in camera review to the much particularized facts of
the Quillin cases alone.29' To do otherwise will have disastrous effects
upon the FOIA and those who use it. First, it would place a wholly
unnecessary and overwhelming burden upon the already overworked
legal system. Further, it would require trial judges to differentiate the
public from the private. This judicial determination is not required by
the FOIA, and it delays the public's access to records far beyond the
three day period permitted by the General Assembly.
Additionally, the government should always resort first to the tradi-
tional method of guidance when it is unsure about the release of records: the
Arkansas Attorney General's Office. To do so protects the records custodian
from criminal liability and offers a safe harbor for the government, without
the needless hassle of going through the court system.
V. CONCLUSION
These scandals illustrate the polar ends of what can be achieved
by utilizing the FOIA. Again, the purpose of the FOIA is simple:
It is vital in a democratic society that public business be performed
in an open and public manner so that the electors shall be advised
of the performance of public officials and of the decisions that are
reached in public activity and in making public policy. Toward this
end, [the FOIA] is adopted, making it possible for them, or their
representatives to learn and to report fully the activities of their of-
ficials.29
The end result of the Houston Nutt scandal illustrates the full rea-
lization of this goal: the citizens were provided timely access to go-
vernmental records that highlighted the activities of the government.
The end result of the Ron Quillin scandal illustrates the perverse sub-
version of this goal: the citizens were not provided timely access to
governmental records, and the government attempted to preclude
291. While it is tempting to implore the General Assembly to craft some legislative
exit out of this quagmire, such efforts would be a waste of time and effort. Simply put,
the plain, express, and unambiguous language of the FOIA cannot be made more
plain, express, and unambiguous.
292. ARK. CODE ANN. § 25-19-102 (LEXIS Repl. 2002).
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them from learning of a public official's lack of performance. And
worse still, the Quillin II majority has made an ex cathedra pro-
nouncement that adds a cumbersome new requirement into the FOIA
when the government fails to abide by its plain requirements.
These various circumstances also demonstrate that the tension
that began with construing the FOIA at the advent of the electronic
era has not eased. It is evident that few people in Arkansas under-
stand the wide scope of information that is now attainable through the
FOIA, at least until they become unpleasantly surprised upon receiv-
ing a FOIA request. Until such time as the government and its actors
gain greater comprehension of the FOIA, they would do well to heed
the lessons learned by Houston Nutt and Ron Quillin and to heed the
privacy sacrifices that are made in maintaining a transparent govern-
ment.
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